The Fate of the Nation-State

Introduction

By

Michel Seymour

What is the most appropriate political institutional model for the next millennium? Should we look primarily to the nation-state, the multinational state, or to supranational institutional structures that leave no real sovereignty to the component states? Has the nation-state become obsolete? Are multination states viable? Can we really create powerful supranational institutions?

There are frequent claims made nowadays about the end of the nation-state, but establishing successful multinational states has proven to be highly problematic. Indeed, there are several types of nation-states: there are "ethnic" nation-states, founded through the process known as "nation-state building" (e.g. Germany), and "civic" nation-states, founded through the process known as "state-nation building" (e.g. France). It would appear that certain types of nation-states are outmoded, but others deserve to be maintained, especially those who are able to recognize their polyethnic and pluricultural character. Whatever the specifics of each case, the redefinition of the nation-state raises complex problems due to the difficulties inherent in trying to take into account the fluidity of identities with regard to such characteristics as gender, class and ethnicity. In addition, one cannot avoid taking into account the sometimes antagonistic dynamics

associated with national, feminist and anti-racist movements.

Along with different ways of conceptualizing the nation-state, there are also different ways of conceptualizing the multinational state. There are *de facto* multinational states (such as Canada, a territorial federation based on the equality of provinces) and *de jure* multinational states, that is, states whose multinational character is reflected in its constitution and institutions (such as Belgium, a multinational federation).

For some, the people of the multination state must have a common culture in order to be viable. It is thus conceived as an inclusive cultural nation composed of several specific cultural nations. The model is here perhaps Great Britain. The idea is that its viability depends on a thick multinational identity. For others, the multinational state requires only a thin identity. The only common identity within this state may be the civic identity associated with it. Hence its viability requires only a constitutional patriotism, such as the one promoted by Jürgen Habermas.

There are, however, other ways to conceptualize the multination state. One could simultaneously foster a common civic identity through the state and implement a politics of recognition toward the nations composing it. The idea is to avoid imposing a single language, a single culture and a single history to the whole population, and avoid also having recourse to a thin, purely formal, civic identity that would threaten in the long run the stability of the state. The solution is to adopt a politics of recognition as a substitute for the absence of a strong durable common cultural affiliation. Such a recognition would

induce a strong sentiment of loyalty to the encompassing state and a relation of trust would soon follow. A final possible option bears mentioning, that of taking a pragmatic and pluralist position. Just as there are different ways of defining the nation, and thus different populations articulating different self-representations with a different national consciousness on different territories, there are also different acceptable model of political organization. We could argue that there are several institutional political models: different acceptable forms of nation-states and different acceptable forms of multination states.

Beyond the nation-states and multination States, we must also examine supranational organizations, and reflect upon their viability. Is there such a thing as "postnational identity" and is it a substitute or just an addition to our more usual national ties? Are supranational organizations constraining the power and influence of nation-states to an unacceptable degree? These questions are raised with regard to the United Nations, but also, and especially, with the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and, more generally, the entire range of phenomena associated with economic globalization. These new realities are the context from within which we should reexamine the traditional conflict between the nation-state and the supranational organizations.

Supranational organizations may take the form of confederations of nation-states, in which the component states remain sovereign. Others defend a hybrid model involving both federative and confederative links such as it is now presently the case in

Europe. Some are also imagining a “federation of nation-states” for the future of Europe. Europe could become a federation as a way to circumvent the insuperable obstacles that would result otherwise from by an enlarged European composed of twenty five states with multiple vetos. But it would still be a federation of nation-states because of the absence of a federal state.

These are some of the questions that are raised in this collection of essays. It is divided into two sections: one dealing with theoretical foundations and one dealing with case studies. The eight essays that compose the first section could themselves be divided into two separate groups. The first group (Canovan, Greenfeld, Weinstock, Couture and Poole) is roughly concerned with issues relative to the viability of the nation-state, and focus on nations and nationalism, while the second group (Seymour, Ingram, Nielsen and Margalit) deals mostly with issues relative to the viability of multinational states or supranational organizations, and thus with political recognition, minority rights and the defense of the nation in a global economy. By grouping these essays in this way, we wish to distinguish different dominant topics or identify the main themes and the division is not meant to reflect different opinions or underline different normative attitudes toward the nation-state.

Margaret Canovan’s paper examines three connected paradoxes facing political theorists who try to come to terms with nationhood and nationalism. The paradoxes suggest that the topic of nations and nationalism is a particularly difficult one to deal with. During the twentieth century most Western political theorists ignored or dismissed

nationhood and nationalism. But in constructing their own theories, the same thinkers tacitly relied upon nations to provide solutions to question that were not explicitly addressed. This is a first paradox. The second one is this. After the fall of communism woke the slumbering beasts of nationalism, many political theorists responded by working out theoretical defenses of national self-determination. But, paradoxically, these theorists lay claim to universal authority, thereby actually licensing high-minded imperialism instead of the self-rule they set out to defend. Finally, these self-contradictions may seem to lend support to a cosmopolitan rejection of nationhood and nationalism. But international institutions are off-shoots of nation-states rather than alternatives to them. This is yet a third paradox. Canovan concludes that political theorists would be well advised, when formulating their theories, to pay more sustained attention to these crucial features of political life.

According to Liah Greenfeld, the fate of the nation-state is intimately tied to that of modernity, by which she understands the specific character of social, political, and economic reality present in many societies of the past two centuries and, perhaps, the majority of societies today. Modernity is modeled or *constructed* on the basis of national consciousness and in this sense is *created* by nationalism. When this form of consciousness will disappear, the corresponding form of social (as well as political and economic) reality will disappear together with it, to be replaced by a new one—of the kind we cannot as yet imagine—modeled on a different image of reality. So nationalism is constitutive of modernity. This is the reason why, according to Greenfeld, the nation-state model was never questioned from a liberal standpoint. This view is, of course,

compatible with many different ways of defining the notion of a people. It is compatible, for instance, with an understanding of the 'people' as constituted by the whole population of Europe or even by the whole population of the globe. Nevertheless, the modern state has always been, according to Greenfeld, a nation-state.

Daniel Weinstock distinguishes four "ideal-types" of nation-building. He discusses some of the difficulties facing three of these types. They are all "top-down" in the sense that loyalty is imposed from above. He then suggests that a fourth model, which he terms "organic nation-building", offers a fruitful strategy for the "construction" of political communities in the future. It is a bottom-up kind of nation-state building in which loyalty is created from below. Weinstock argues against the claim that the state can reliably produce the right kind of commonality by engaging into top-down nation-building. It is also according to him problematic to suggest that the viability of institutions and the stability of society is a goal of sufficient moral importance that its pursuit should allow actions undertaken by the state to be performed not on the basis of what people want, but on the basis of what they ought to want. He also wishes to counter the claim that the viability of the institutions of liberal democracy and the stability of liberal democratic societies require that citizens view themselves as united by a shared identity. He doubts that citizens require shared identity or values in order to abstain from acting in ways deleterious to the political order to which they find themselves belonging. So according to Weinstock, the post-national political institutions of tomorrow will have to find ways to generate loyalties, sentiments of common purpose and habits of cooperation among peoples who had previously thought of themselves as politically separate.

One of the challenges facing contemporary theoreticians of nationalism is to show that it could have beneficial consequences within the framework of those emerging phenomena we generically refer to as globalization. With this desideratum in mind, Jocelyne Couture's paper aims to compare and evaluate, from a moral and political point of view, the arguments in favor of nationalism put forward from within communitarian, liberal, and cosmopolitan theories. She argues that these conceptions of nationalism cannot provide an adequate foundation for political organization, be it on a local or a supranational scale. Apart from their insensitivity to the particular problems raised by the present world context, the leading contemporary conceptions of the nation manifest, in her view, a defective conception of the most general requirements of democracy. She then articulates a conception of nationalism based on solidarity and she shows how, while retaining certain characteristic features of the other theories, it requires contrary to them both the existence and maintenance of nation-states and democratic supranational institutions. The conception of the nation that should be promoted, in view of the current state of the world, is that of a nation which is at once cultural, sociological and political. A solidaristic version of nationalism is not a barrier to globalization, but it is a condition for a globalization that is more humane and more respectful of societies; and it promises greater solidarity among peoples.

Ross Poole argues that culture is and ought to be an integral part of politics. This has important implications for our way of thinking about multination states, and similarly important consequences for our way of dealing with Aboriginal peoples. His argument

runs as follows. National identity has been the crucial condition of legitimacy for the modern state. The reason is that the nation has provided the form in which republican ideals of citizenship have found expression in the modern world. On the basis of these considerations, it appears that if there are to be viable multination states, they will have to be “multination nation-states”. Poole then argues that not all nation-state building involve assimilation of national minorities. He cites Great-Britain as an example of a nation-state that was able to recognize to a certain extent its component national minorities. Fostering a unique common culture at the level of the encompassing state is compatible with the recognition of minority nations. The case of Aboriginal populations is another case in point. Full sovereignty is certainly not in the cards for Aboriginal peoples. But at the same time, these peoples want more than simply the protection of their language and their culture. They have territorial and self-government claims to make. But the encompassing states that would grant them such an autonomy could very well be nation-states. So it appears problematic to argue that the social bonds that tie component nations together have to be very thin. After all, there are clear cases where this does not appear to be so.

In the second group of theoretical essays, Michel Seymour, David Ingram, Kai Nielsen and Avishai Margalit examine different alternatives to the traditional nation-state model, whether these are multination states or supranational organizations that would limit the sovereignty of actual nation-states.

Michel Seymour investigates the conditions that would ensure the viability of multination states. He argues that in order to do that, we should implement politics of

recognition toward the component nations belonging to those states. Such a political recognition should lead to the entrenchment of the collective rights of nations (or peoples) in the constitution of the encompassing state. He begins by trying to explain why liberal philosophers have been inclined to argue against politics of recognition. The explanation of the motivations behind this position is that there existed historically a very close relationship between liberalism and the traditional nation-state model, and this historical connection was such that ethical individualism mistakenly came to be perceived as constitutive of liberalism. The problem is that ethical individualism enters into tension if not in contradiction with politics of recognition. Seymour then critically examines the view according to which it is possible to use ethical individualism as an appropriate framework for a liberal theory of collective rights. He criticizes Kymlicka's attempt to reconcile the two views. The defects of Kymlicka's theory of group-differentiated rights are explained by his favorable inclination toward individualism. Seymour concludes the paper by describing an alternative theory of collective rights. The favored approach is that of political liberalism.

David Ingram argues that talk of international justice is worthless unless it is wedded to realistic conceptions of mutually advantageous co-operation. Hence the question: Can we envisage a system of international justice that is as realistic as it is utopian? Two of the world's leading political philosophers, Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, think we can. Ingram examines their reasons for thinking so. He shows that the disagreement between Rawls and Habermas on human rights highlights fundamental tensions in our thinking about what justice demands. Their disagreement highlights

differing assessments about the cultural viability of nations and groups as unified, self-determining centers of collective agency. Rawls is right to hold that within the law of peoples nations can be recipients of rights no less than individuals. Habermas may well be right in insisting on a strong connection between liberal democracy and respect for human rights. In conclusion, Ingram argues that neither Habermas nor Rawls presents an adequate account of the equal priority of economic, social, and cultural rights. Some economic rights are basic; and realizing them will require more radical changes in global governance structures that either Rawls or Habermas countenances. Some cultural rights are basic, too. This means – contrary to Habermas's cosmopolitan liberalism and Rawls's political liberalism – that the rights of groups no less than the rights of individuals will sometimes have to be politically recognized within liberal democracy.

Kai Nielsen observes that, paradoxically, during a period where there is a resurgence of nationalism and, with the politics of recognition, the importance to human beings of a sense of national identity is becoming more evident, the relentless forces of globalization and the new economic order seem at least to be undermining the ability of states to order their own affairs. Is the idea of national sovereignty slowly becoming folkloric? He proposes to state in the most forceful way possible the strongest arguments for obsolescence and then he critically assesses their soundness. Nielsen distinguishes between weak globalization and strong globalization. Weak globalization appears to be compatible with the existence of nation-states and multination states, while strong globalization is understood in neo-liberal terms. He believes that neo-liberal globalization poses a grave threat to democracy and to a reasonable autonomy for

nation-states or for multination-states. His defense of those “traditional” models does not however stand in conflict with a cosmopolitan social liberal nationalism. But Nielsen concludes that we should not dismiss the claim about the obsolescence of socially oriented nation-states as just a potful of neo-liberal ideology. Globalization is becoming sufficiently strong so as to require us seriously to consider whether nation-states can have, given capitalist globalization, sufficient control over their affairs so as to justify our believing that they have the power to provide the conditions of life in a social order that is self-determining.

Avishai Margalit critically examines cosmopolitan ideals in the context of the urgent need of putting in place international civilized and non humiliating institutions. To be able to do this, we have to think in terms of Global Decency. Cosmopolitan ideals appear to him to be unrealistic, if understood as implying the existence of a world-state. Making the establishment of a decent society depend on the creation of a world-state first is not a way of responding to the urgency of stopping institutional humiliation. The more urgent and realistic question is rather to inquire upon the possibility and justification for international intervention in the context of cruelty and humiliation of persons and national minorities. The presumption is in favor of a direct international intervention where cruelty is taking place. When a people is apparently being humiliated, international intervention is to be decided on a case by case examination.

In the second part of the book, we have gathered ‘case studies’, in which

particular problems are examined within particular societies. Once again, this section could be divided into two separate groups. In the first group of essays (Evangelista, McGarry, McCrone, Guibernau Kumar and Murphy), the authors mostly investigate multinational societies and wonder how these could be preserved. Their concern is essentially to understand the internal self-determination of peoples.

Evangelista discusses the impact of the first war in Chechnya, reviews Boris Yeltsin's policies, and then considers Putin's reforms. According to him, Putin's system of regional super-regions puts individual rights and regional autonomy at risk without providing compensating improvements in overall quality of life. Evangelista argues that Putin's attempt to recentralize Russia and do away with Yeltsin's legacy of "asymmetric federalism" could prove counterproductive. Putin should recognize that ruling the world's largest country from a single capital city is unrealistic. Some form of genuine federalism, perhaps still a negotiated, asymmetric federalism, is Russia's best hope. The reason is that the Russian Federation is far more complicated than the ex-Soviet Union, and its disintegration would be far messier. Evangelista concludes that Russians could end up with the worst of both worlds -- an authoritarian regime that fails to bring order and peace to the fractured Russian Federation.

John McGarry notes that it is common for observers to see Northern Ireland as a site of rival sectarian or ethnic ideologies. It appears an ideal place, therefore, for the promotion of an inclusive, civic form of nationalism. But he argues that the Northern Ireland conflict has been, in an important way, the result of a struggle between two rival civic projects, one Irish, the other British, rather than between rival exclusionary projects.

He claims that the accommodation of difference, paradoxically, is the only realistic way to construct any overarching identity in Northern Ireland in the longer term. He acknowledges that the Good Friday Agreement is fragile, but argues that Northern Ireland is more stable now than it has been in thirty years. He also argues that bi-national compromise is a better guarantee of stability than either Northern Ireland's integration into a united Ireland or its integration into the United Kingdom.

David McCrone argues that Scotland has developed an advanced form of nationalism without strong differentials of language, religion or other cultural means. The key to the Scottish question lies less in its internalist conflicts and tensions and much more in its politico-constitutional relations with the British State. Historically, the unwillingness or inability of the UK to modernize its political institutions left civil society "to its own devices", and these were favorable conditions for a non problematic cohabitation of the Scottish people within Great Britain. But by the second half of the 20th Century, the contradictions which were inherent in the Union became more salient. The rise of nationalism in Scotland can thus only be explained in terms of geopolitics.

Montserrat Guibernau explores the political scenario set up by the Spanish 1978 Constitution which recognized the existence of 'nationalities and regions' within Spain and allowed the country to be divided into seventeen autonomous communities. She analyses the image of Catalonia contained in the 1979 Statute of Autonomy. She also offers an account of the nationalist discourses put forward by the four major Catalan parties emphasizing their different content depending upon the political ideology with

which they are associated. Finally she evaluates twenty years of Catalan political autonomy and examines the new initiatives and demands emerging from Catalan society. In conclusion, Guibernau notes that, traditionally, only a small minority has supported secession in Catalonia, but at present this minority is growing. The ERC secessionist discourse may attract some new supporters which could consolidate the party as Catalonia's third political force and place it in a key position, particularly if neither the CiU nor the Catalan Socialists were to achieve the majority in the forthcoming 2003 Catalan election.

Radha Kumar examines partition as it occurred in five different regions: Palestine, Cyprus, India, Bosnia and Ireland. She contrasts secessions and dissolutions of federations from partition. When an already existing unit leaves a state, it is secession. Where new borders have to be carved out of existing units, it is partition. She reviews what were the best and worst case options before *de jure* or *de facto* partitions took place, and also offers an examination of the best and worst case options now that partition has taken place. Kumar also discusses key-issues of post-conflict stabilization in partition related conflicts. She then draws five lessons from the history of partition. (i) Partitions do not work as a solution to ethnic conflict. (ii) Because partition restructures the sources of conflict, the separation of warring parties gained by partition is only temporary. (iii) Historical examples of alternative solutions based on a combination of human rights and devolution can be useful. (iv) Post-conflict reconstruction will be slow unless local communities are involved. (v) Finally, evolution with devolution has enormous potential.

Michael Murphy argues that indigenous peoples around the world are increasingly adopting the language of nationalism to describe their claims to self-determination. While this nationalist discourse has attracted attention from theorists of multicultural or multinational diversity, relatively few works focus intensively on the question of indigenous nationalism, and fewer yet investigate the relationship between the democratic dimensions of indigenous nationalism and the distinctive challenges associated with its implementation in concrete cases and contexts. This chapter attempts to fill some of these gaps in our understanding of indigenous nationalism. First, it develops a theoretical understanding of indigenous nationalism in terms of three interrelated dimensions of democratic self-determination: external democracy, internal democracy, and shared-ruled democracy. Second, it responds to some common criticisms of indigenous nationalism by making a clearer distinction between its normative and empirical-institutional dimensions. Third, it exploring the implications of this normative framework in concrete political terms by examining what kinds of indigenous communities will exercise the right to self-determination, and what sorts of institutional possibilities are possible and/or already exist in practice. The discussion draws on examples from Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.

In the second group of case studies, the authors investigate problems related to the viability of particular nation-states. The first three papers (Pogge, Milner and Bhargava) respectively examine countries such as the United States, Finland and India where we witness the presence within the nation-state of populations that can be described as extensions of neighboring national majorities, or described as ‘contiguous

diasporas', to use Radha Kumar's own phrase.

Thomas Pogge wonders which accommodations ought to be offered, and which refused, to native speakers of Spanish within the US, and he investigates the moral grounds for those accommodations. Should the state protect a minority's culture by offering its children public education only in the minority language? This suggestion clashes with the best interests of children and also with liberal rights of their parents. Liberals cannot permit the interest of minority children to be sacrificed, and the preferences of their parents to be overruled, in order to help other members of this minority preserve their culture. In designing educational institutions, the interests of children must be paramount. Where the most important linguistic competence for children is fluency in English, schools should aim for such fluency first and foremost. Most minority children in the US are served best by instruction in English. This leads to a principle not of *English-Only*, but of *English-First*: While most minority children should be brought to full mastery of English, there is every reason to enable and encourage them to develop full mastery of their native language as well.

In his paper, Henry Milner explores the various dimensions of the relationship between the Finnish majority and the Swedish minority in Finland, from Constitutional rights and prerogatives, to informal mechanisms underlying the relationship. Among the former is the special position of the Swedish-speaking Island of Ahland; among the latter is the role and composition of the Swedish People's Party. While no country can serve as a "model" for other countries, given the uniqueness of different experiences, Milner argues that there are indeed useful lessons to be learned from this country. Though the

overall Finnish approach is thus inapplicable to Quebec - at least a Quebec with only the powers of a Canadian province - there is still one important lesson directly applicable to Quebec in Finnish practice and experience. English Quebec needs the equivalent of the Swedish Peoples' Party, which, combined with proportional representation, would guarantee it fair political representation. English Quebec could, over time, reject the uncompromising approach of the Equality Party and Alliance Quebec, and, learning from Finland, develop leaders and policies that could contribute to creative compromises reflecting the needs and interests of both minority and majority.

Rajeev Bhargava discusses identity-dependent majority and minority issues in the context of Muslim minorities within India. A "majority/minority syndrome" sets in when either the minority or the majority is unable to exercise power and blames the other for this disadvantage. Most oif the time, of course, it is the minority that is suffering such an injustice. A majority/minority framework is one in which groups have distinct identities and are recognized as such. Bhargava believes that the syndrome may be removed by the framework. It is not part of the problem but rather part of the solution. The majority/ minority framework involves constitutionally protected minority rights. It may not be sufficient but it is necessary for alleviating the source of the syndrome. In India, the issue of minority rights is intimately tied to the maintenance of Muslim personal laws. Bhargava rejects both the radical individualists who wish to abandon the framework and the conservative communitarians who seek to preserve it. He accepts personal laws in principle, but he favors a reformist position that imposes important modifications to those personal laws that violate basic human rights, and he also subscribes to an indirect form

of paternalist reformism in virtue of which the state provides conditions which facilitate reform within the community.

The next three essays (Brubaker, Anderson and McRoberts) can be interpreted as providing together some insights concerning the fate of nation-states.

Rogers Brubaker seeks to specify key persisting differences in the way questions of ethnicity, migration, and statehood are posed in Western and Eastern Europe. As far as ethnicity is concerned, Western Europe endorses an *immigrant ethnicity* model, in which ethnic groups arise through migration and do not make collective claims to indigeneity. Eastern Europe endorses a *territorial nationality* model in which ethnic groups are indigenous. So the political claims that can be made in the name of ethnicity differ sharply in the two cases. The immigrant ethnicity model is characterized by politics of anti-discrimination, civic inclusion, and "soft multiculturalism," where the latter involves claims to public recognition, to resources for cultural activities, and sometimes to special immunities and exemptions. The problematics of migration in Western Europe have been focused on questions of *immigration,* especially immigration from outside the region, while in Eastern Europe, questions of migration have been, in the first instance, questions of *emigration*. In conclusion, Brubaker argues that if Western Europe is entering a post-national age, the political context for much of Eastern Europe might more aptly be described as *post-multinational*. While in Western Europe, the trend is toward the unbundling and redistribution of previously concentrated powers, state-building is still very much on the agenda in Eastern Europe.

Benedict Anderson argues that "Indonesia" is still a "real country" and that there is no good alternative to the recuperation of its traditional nationalism. The essay is divided into three parts. He first discusses the reasons for the present deep crisis. He then explains why he thinks certain multiethnic nation-states, like Indonesia, are worth recuperating and strengthening, in view of the alternatives. One key condition is that no component ethnic group should command an electoral majority, nor control the state apparatus. A second is that there is in Indonesia an accepted national language, and an accepted national history that is not founded on the 'legacy' of any one ethnic or religious group. He finally considers the difficulties facing national recuperation in the present conjuncture, especially in the face of the immense political, economic, cultural, and moral damage inflicted on the country for more than three decades by the Suharto regime with almost universal (till the last moment) international support, and the various prescriptions for "cure" currently on the table -- particularly 'regional autonomy,' and deeper deregulation of the state. The conclusion is a defense of the nineteenth century national idea for the decades that lie ahead.

Ken McRoberts notices that nation-states are nowadays losing some of their prerogatives, but he wonders about the nations within these nation-states. In other words, what about the many “minority nations” or “nations without states” that have continued to persist despite the best efforts of the “nation-states” to absorb them? He also notices that the context of integration is fundamentally different in Europe and in North-America. There is a collective European identity in Europe but there are no supranational North American institutions to support and foster a North American

identity. Precisely for that reason, there is a strong identification with regions and nations within the states of North America. For instance, a growing number of Quebec residents identify with Quebec more than with Canada. Fourty nine percent of Quebeckers say that they are Quebeckers first. Only half of Quebeckers are “proud to be Canadians”. So the *state* component of the nation-state couplet may be in decline. But we should not exaggerate the decline, even for smaller nation-states, for the *nation* is not necessarily in decline. On the contrary, it seems to be faring quite well.

In a concluding chapter, I draw some lessons from the twenty one essays contained in this book. It seems to me that the lessons one can draw are threefold. First, the nation-state can no longer count as the only model of political organization. In addition to the nation-state, we must find ways to consolidate multination states and supranational organizations. We may also conclude that the alternatives to the traditional nation-state model will not be viable unless the encompassing states are able to conduct themselves properly with their component minority nations. Multination (nation)states cannot be viable unless political recognition is afforded to the component nations. The third and last conclusion is the following. If truly liberal and democratic minority nations are unable to gain political recognition within the multination state, they will morally be justified to gain such political recognition by achieving full sovereignty or by performing collective civil disobedience. Just as one should not adopt the nation-state as the unique model of political organization, one should admit that there are circumstances in which the multination state is no longer viable and when the creation of a new nation-state is morally justified.